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Over the past three decades, many things have changed in Brazil.
Democracy has replaced a military dictatorship, and Cardoso’s neo-
liberal reforms have replaced hyperinflation and import substitution
subsidies. However, despite some reductions in overall poverty rates,
income and land distribution remain among the most unequal in the
world. In the favelas (illegal land occupations) and housing projects of
Rio de Janeiro, the number of urban poor has grown over the past 30
years to 40 per cent of the city’s population (UNDP 2001). Drug
trafficking groups now exert more control over low-income com-
munities and favelas than any government. In the context of these
dramatic changes, how have Rio de Janeiro’s poor made use of notions
of citizenship and rights? While certain rights are part of a basic
language used by even the extremely poor and marginalized, traditional
national democratic citizenship is failing to have meaning for the poor.
This chapter will show how poor families in Rio de Janeiro are
reinterpreting notions of citizenship on the basis of their experience of
exclusion from formal political and economic structures. 
The chapter draws on accounts of citizenship given by low-income
families from different urban spaces, classes and races from within Rio
de Janeiro: families from favelas, the housing projects and from the
working class suburbs. By different urban spaces, I am referring to the
stark spatial categories that characterize Rio de Janeiro. In addition to
the ascribed class boundaries demarcated by the Zona Sul (traditional
wealthy region), Zona Norte (industrialized working class area), Zone
Oeste (newly rich, Miami-like region), and the subúrbios (working class
allotments around the periphery), space in Rio de Janeiro is divided by
degrees of legality. Although all favelas are technically illegal land
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occupations, some have clearer legal status than others. Favelas are
interspersed throughout all three regions of the city, but concentrated in
the Zona Norte, and as a result have greater legitimacy because there is
little threat of removal there. By contrast, new favelas in the Zona Oeste
are reminiscent of the shantytowns of the 1960s, with very precarious
holds on the land and extremely poor conditions. These spatial
categories have significant impacts on the lives of the poor in Rio de
Janeiro (see Figure 6.1; for a more in-depth discussion see Wheeler
2001). 
Data was collected through 40 open-ended interviews with
extended families (three to four members of the same family from three
generations) between September 2001 and March 2002. Questions
focused on participants’ perceptions of their citizenship, and
participation in various aspects of city life. The following analysis also
relies, as a secondary research source, on interviews with key com-
munity leaders, non-profit workers and members of the government.
Context
Hannah Arendt argues that ‘the fundamental deprivation of human
rights [and citizenship] is manifested first and above all in the deprivation
of a place in the world [a political space] which makes opinions significant,
and actions effective’ (Jelin 1998, p. 405, emphasis added). A confluence
of different factors in Rio de Janeiro has worked to dislodge the poor
from their ‘place in the world’ and increase their distance from the
political and economic mechanisms of power. First, despite increasing
democratization in Brazil, extreme inequalities persist. The 2001 World
Bank Development Report gives Brazil’s Gini coefficient as 0.60 – second
only to Sierra Leone. For every year from 1970 to 1998, the richest 1
per cent of the population has received more income than the poorest
50 per cent of the population (Pães de Barros, Henriques and
Mendonça 2000). And while the constitution of 1988 promises
extensive rights and protections, the implementation of those rights has
been slow to non-existent in many areas. 
Second, neo-liberal reforms, as in much of Latin America, have been
used to erode the boundary between public responsibilities and private
roles. In particular, neo-liberal reforms have taxed the family structure,
because as the state withdraws from social services, the family and social
networks must fill the gap at a time when even fewer resources are
available for those needs. The situation for women is particularly
contradictory, because both growing financial pressures and the
expectations behind neo-liberalism’s ‘market citizen’ have forced more
Kabeer 06  30/11/04  11:27 am  Page 100
Participation, community and family in Rio de Janeiro \ 101
women to participate in remunerated work in the market economy
(Bulbeck 1998, p. 99). In poor families, women’s contributions make
up to 38 per cent of the family’s income (UNECLAC 1997). But there
is no change in the distribution of household responsibilities: women
are still responsible for childcare, cleaning, shopping and, in many cases,
securing education and health care for the family. This problem is
exacerbated in the case of single-mother households, which are
dramatically on the rise in Brazil and Rio de Janeiro. Single mothers
now head one in four households in Brazil (up from one in six in 1991)
and earn an average US$246 per month in comparison to men’s
US$344 per month (IBGE: Journal do Brasil 2002, p. 18). 
Finally, the power of drug trafficking groups in low-income
communities is increasingly unqualified by any form of state inter-
vention other than ineffectual and deadly raids by military police. Drug-
traffic-related violence and the invasive power of drug mafias over poor
communities in Rio de Janeiro are major factors in invalidating national
democratic citizenship for the participants in this study. Drug traffickers
are known as the poder parallelo (parallel power) because they control
favelas and housing projects as if they were independent states and
exercise all the powers of an autocratic government over the residents.
The level of violence in some parts of the city peaked at 80 homicides
per 100,000 people (equivalent to the levels of violence in Colombia
and South Africa). From 1995 to 2000, the levels of violence declined
somewhat (UNDP 2001), but in 2003 there was a significant resur-
gence, culminating in the bombing of city government buildings, bus
burnings and army occupation of the streets during Carnival 2003.
However, the violence in Rio de Janeiro, while endemic, is not
homogeneous. It is, to use Holston and Appadurai’s phrase, a ‘city-
specific violence of citizenship’, meaning that it affects specific places
and persons differently (2000, p. 16). The highest rates of violence are
in favelas and poor neighbourhoods for Afro-Brazilians (Zona Oeste and
Zona Norte) (see Figure 6.1) (UNDP 2001).
There, the violence is a combination of state-sponsored raids and
battles with drug mafias (in 2001 over 900 civilians were killed by the
police in Rio de Janeiro), and wars between competing factions and
mafias of the drug trade (UNDP 2001). The extremely high level of
violence in poor neighbourhoods due to the drug trade dramatically
orders the daily lives of the residents of those communities. It is now
unsafe to use public spaces like streets, bus stops and plazas after dark,
and increasingly during the day. In one housing project involved in the
study, one faction of traffickers took control of the local school and
another of the local day care centre, and children were unable to attend
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